Madam President – EVM an instrument of a Constitutional Crisis: #EVM – My letter to CEC on Reply of ECI on Issues raised by Shri V.V. Rao

Sr. No. Issues raised by Shri V.V. Rao

Reply of the Commission

1. What is the reason of using a generic chip instead of specifically designed ASIC chip in Electronic Voting

Machine?

These chips have been found appropriate by the manufacturers of EVMs. They have been specially customized for ECI-EVMs. Such customized chips are not available in the market.

IMO:1.1: My observation

1. EVM manufacturers as vendors of ECI: The relationship between ECI and Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) and Electronics Corp. of India Ltd. (ECIL) as vendors need to be explained considering ECI statement – found appropriate by the manufacturers. Both the vendors do not function under ECI. Therefore, the answer by ECI to Question 1 falls short of accountability factors that need to be addressed in assigning responsibility.

2. Preventive measures of corruption – Public reporting: There are three parties i.Manufacturer of micro-chips, ii.Manufacturers and assemblers of EVMs and iii.ECI.

• The contractual obligations between the three, clearly specifying the areas of corrupt practices that may arise but need to be prevented, the preventive measures undertaken, governance-audit-control measures undertaken, responsibility delineated, accountability statement certified, need to be published by Article 10 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) – Public Reporting which stands ratified by the signatory to the Convention Government of India.

UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status as of 06 January 2012ⁱ

Country

Signature

Ratification, Acceptance (A), Approval (AA), Accession (a), Succession (d)

India

9 Dec 2005

1 May 2011

Source: United Nations Office On Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

2. Is the Chip with same part number available in the market for others for developing other applications?

Part numbers of chips are proprietary and are made exclusively for ECIL & BEL respectively. The same are not available for other applications.

IMO:1.2: My observation

• My observation – same as IMO 1. In addition, the manufacturers statement in this respect is more relevant than that of ECI. Furthermore ECI does not have any control over ECIL, BEL as well as the manufacturers of microchips other than a contractual obligation written and signed between the four (see IMO:1.3) parties. Therefore, relevant sections in the signed contract be published under Article 10 of UNCAC Public Reporting including product liability clauses.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

Sr. No. Issues raised by Shri V.V. Rao

Reply of the Commission

3. What is process involved in the procurement of the chip & who are the people involved in that process?

Chip is purchased from the chip manufacturer through their authorized distributor.

IMO:1.3: My observation

• My observation – same as IMO 1. In addition fourth party, i.e. their distributor is introduced that needs to be added.

• How does ECI ensure – between the manufacturers of EVM and manufacturer/ distributor of EVM micro-chips? as to satisfy the provisions under Article 9. of UNCAC, Public procurement and management of public finances.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

4. What is the precise transport process of sending the code to the chip vendor?

The object code is handed over to the chip manufacturer through a secured process.

IMO:1.4: My observation

• My observation – same as IMO 3. In addition confidentiality clause is added.

• How does ECI ensure – that the manufacturers of EVM satisfy the provisions under Article 8. of UNCAC, Codes of conduct for public officials?

• Incident reporting – How does ECI report incidents that may be considered to constitute an offence established under UNCAC -of the four parties concerned – ECI, manufacturer of chips, their distributor and manufacturers/assemblers of EVMs?

• Are such incidents reported under Article 10 of UNCAC Public Reporting and how often?

• How many persons are privy to the object code and how often the system of confidentiality is audited and confirmed secure?

• Since ECI has no administrative control over any of the vendors how does ECI check the conflict of interests between authorised persons of vendors and their administrative superiors?

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

5. Does the Election commission have the information on procurement chips & the process involved?

Manufacturers are reputed public sector undertakings on which ECI has full confidence. Entire information on the process of manufacturing of EVMs was given by the manufacturers to the Expert Committee. The Expert Committee after having considered all issues was fully satisfied with the process.

IMO:1.5: My observation

• ECI answer needs to be unequivocal. Who does ECI refer to as ‘manufacturers’, manufacturers of chips or EVMs?

• Has the expert committee considered the reputed hackers who could destabilize the entire process of EVM-chips?

• Has the expert committee record the vulnerability and threat perception for corrupt practices between paper ballot and EVM?

• By Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting let ECI please make public aware of the above points as well as why by Article 13 of UNCAC Participation of Society, public was not given a chance to opt for a)paper ballot and b) EVM?

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

6. Does Election Commission keep any audit/maintain a record on chips procured and chips used in EVMs, Chips damaged before manufacturing and chips in stock? Please provide the audit details from 1990 till date.

ECI does not keep records of components. These records are maintained by the manufacturers.

IMO:1.6: My observation

• ECI does not keep records of components– This admission is governance-deficit of ECI. It appears ECI does not have any records whatsoever on a subject matter of EVM that is claimed as the most modern technological innovation with proprietary IPR while a simple material spare parts accounting system is absent.

• Under Article 9 UNCAC Public procurement and management of public finances, Sec. 2 Clause (c) A system of accounting and auditing standards and related oversight, is expected from ECI in order to: take appropriate measures to promote transparency and accountability in the management of public finances. Has not the ECI unequivocally shirked taking the responsibility by the statement: ECI does not keep records of components?

• Contractual obligation between the four parties, i.e. i.manufacturer of chips, ii.distributor of i, iii.manufacturers of EVM and iv.ECI, need to be published per Article 10 of UNCAC Public reporting.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

7. Is there any encryption in the Ballot unit used for transfer of the data to control unit, if so what is the encryption and what is the software used in the Ballot Unit for enabling such encryption?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:1.7: My observation

• Confidentiality – How does ECI govern confidentiality of encryption while ECI has no administrative control over any of the other three parties to the contracts between all the four?

• Is there a written codes of conduct manual especially for the authorised persons dealing with the confidential details, by name and designation per Article 8. UNCAC Codes of conduct for public officials vis-a-vis persons non-public official but part of the team of outsourced manufacturing of EVMs.

• Prevention of reverse engineering – Can reverse engineering possible when security is breached? If so, what measures are in place? In the event of loss of EVM what policy instructions apply to the EC officials, on the day of reported loss of EVM?

• How many such incidents have occurred of breach of security?

• Have any of the authorised personnel, privy to confidential details, ever been charged for misconduct or corruption pre-during-after time of occupying the said position, either by ECI or by any other authority?

• Please furnish details under Article 10 UNCAC of Public Reporting.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

8. Have the old machines been replaced, and how many more old machines have been used and can we obtain the manufacturing dates, batch numbers, serial numbers including the life of each of the Electronic Voting Machine used in the recent elections held? What is the status of the old mother boards in the upgraded machines?

1989-90 model EVMs are not being used any more. Information on manufacturing dates, batch nos., sr. nos. etc., of EVM is available with the manufacturers. There are no motherboards in the EVM. Old PCBs have not been used in new machines. Old machines are not upgraded. New machines with all its components are manufactured de-novo.

IMO:1.8: My observation

• What is the policy of disposal of old EVMs?

• Are there in stock any of the old EVMs for disposal?

• To whom the EVMs belong to, manufacturers or ECI?

• Do the de-novo EVMs incorporate fresh software encryption or the old ones continue to be used, to clarify your statement ‘not upgraded‘?

• If old software encryption continues in the de-novo EVMs, what control measures are put through in accessing the old EVMs waiting for disposal?

• Please furnish details under Article 10 UNCAC of Public Reporting.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

9. Who are people involved in maintenance of EVM, are they permanent employees of ECIL / BEL or are there any contract labor involved? Please provide the details of the people EVMs are maintained by ECIL and BEL using regular employees.

Contract employees are occasionally used under supervision of permanent employees for non-core functions to help regular employees. Machine’s certification is done by regular employees.

IMO:1.9: My observation

• ECI does not have administrative control over even regular employees let alone the contract employees of the outsourced manufacturers. EVMs are vulnerable for corrupt practices of regular employees and threat perception of EVMs becomes noticeable while employing the contract employees.

• Has ECI issued under Article 5. UNCAC Preventive anti-corruption policies and practices, specific written policy manual of personnel involved with manufacturing?

• Please furnish details under Article 10 UNCAC of Public Reporting.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

10. In the recently concluded Elections, how many of the machines failed to read the E2PROM, & in case of memory becoming unreadable, what are the alternate methods adopted?

Out of 12.99 lakh EVMs in 122 EVMs result was not displayed on the display panel at the time of counting. Since difference of votes between the winner and first runner up was more than the number of total votes polled in that polling station, results were declared. BEL and ECIL is conducting diagnostic test on these EVMs to determine whether there was any case of E2PROM failure.

IMO:1.10: My observation

• the difference between the winner and the first runner up – does it apply to each and every of the 122 EVMs?

• What are the results of diagnostic test on these EVMs that BEL and ECIL had conducted?

• Has there been a policy statement issued for elections conducted subsequent to one when the error was noticed? What are the error ratios in subsequent elections conducted by ECI?

• On a comparative note, in such cases of EVM malfunctioning, ECI is responsible for denying the fundamental rights of citizens for no fault of the voters as against mistakes committed by the voters in case of system of paper ballots when rejected by EC officials during counting.

• Although the rejected votes polled in paper ballot system may far exceed EVM failures of display screens in total, the technology behind EVMs stands vulnerable and not full-proof to sufficiently assure fundamental rights of a voter.

• 122 out of 12.99 lacs EVMs may sound miniscule in a statistical crowd of 120 crores of citizens of India but throwing away a vote casted by an eligible voter violates – Article 13. UNCAC Participation of society (a) Enhancing the transparency of and promoting the contribution of the public to decision-making processes.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

11. What does Election Commission do with the faulty machines, if they are repaired what is the process and who are the people / organizations involved, is

there any Annual Maintenance Contract for the Electronic Voting Machines?

Tests are carried out by BEL and ECIL. Only

mechanical parts are repaired/replaced in the field. PCBs are not repaired in the field. They are replaced in the field and defective PCBs, if any, are repaired in the factory. There is no need of separate annual maintenance contract as machines are maintained only by ECIL and BEL.

IMO:1.11: My observation

• Same as IMO:1.8:

12. Is there any form of Randomization involved before EVM’s are being sent to the Districts for the first level randomization.

EVMs are shifted from one State to another State and also to the districts based on their requirements and exigencies including logistics. In 2009 Lok Sabha Elections, more than 2 lakh EVMs were crisscrossed across the country for the above reasons.

IMO:1.12: My observation: A photo view of EVM criss-crossingⁱⁱ:

• 

• What is the threshold point at which ECI takes responsibility for EVMs and accountability of handling?

• from the circular to all the Chief Electoral Officersⁱⁱⁱ: for the purpose of first level checking and randomization procedure proposed to be introduced through this instruction, all EVMs available in the district shall be brought to the district headquarters under proper escort.; Policy document dated 11 August 2008,whereas the practices followed show as the photos above are dated February 8, 2012.

• In 2009 Lok Sabha Elections, more than 2 lakh EVMs were crisscrossed across the country for the above reasons – why should EVMs criss-cross the states randomly? Why not EVM is assigned to a same place?

• Under Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting ECI should publish information on polices and procedures vis-a-vis practices followed as well as contravened, booth-wise?

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

13. How many people are involved in the EVM code development? Have they signed any non disclosures on Code Security with ECI? Are all the developers are still working with the ECIL/BEL? Is there any guarantee on code security formally provided by ECIL and BEL to ECI?

Code for EVM is written in-house by ECIL and BEL in complete secrecy and is kept confidential in a fully secure manner. Details of security cannot be shared with anybody to prevent breach of security. All the employees of the BEL and ECI are covered under the Official Secrets Act. In view of this a separate guarantee is not necessary.

IMO:1.13: My observation

• to prevent breach of security – All the employees of the BEL and ECI are covered under the Official Secrets Act –

  • In the event of a breach of Official Secrets Act by one of the employees of BEL and ECIL, pertaining specifically to EVM, is the procedure for action against the said officials different from the normal applied procedures as per the rules of BEL and ECIL?

• Per Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting, ECI shall disclose the number of such breach of Official Secrets Act committed by BEL and ECIL plus by IMO:1.7: Have any of the authorised personnel, privy to confidential details, ever been charged for misconduct or corruption pre-during-after time of occupying the said position, either by ECI or by any other authority?

• What about the chips manufacturer and their employees who are not covered under Official Secrets Act?

• In view of this a separate guarantee is not necessary.- What about the officials Secrets Act of ECI? Does not, by the very act of outsourcing EVM code development to a third party, ECI breach the Official Secrets Act? In view of this, is it not imperative for ECI to issue a separate guarantee, to the people of India by ECI.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

IMO:1.1 – 1.13: My observation 1. LIST OF QUESTIONS SUBMITTED ON PROCESS

• Under Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India the Election Commission of India, interalia, is vested with the power of superintendence, direction and control of conducting the elections to the offices of the President and Vice-President of India, to both Houses of Parliament and to both Houses of the State Legislature.

  • ECIL/BEL are business enterprises though state owned. Chips manufacturer and their distributor are entirely beyond the reach of Official Secrets Act of Government of India whereas ECI is a unique constitutional authority.

  • ECI has not acquired expertise in EVM but the entire process of EVM manufacturing including the sensitive codes have been handed over to third-parties including those beyond the shores of India.

  • By virtue of entrusting the sensitive codes to companies over whom ECI has no administrative control and to manufacturer outside India whose jurisdiction beyond ECI’s control, ECI has breached the Official Secrets Act as applicable to ECI.

  • Third-party EVM manufacturing order placed by ECI is therefore an ultra vires act.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

1. Was the Chip used an OTP (Where the code is fused in house at the manufacturer’s location) or Masked

ROM (Where the code is sent outside the country to be fused into the chip at the vendor’s location)?

It is OTP in the case of BEL. It is masked in the case of ECIL. Code is fused in the premises of the chip manufacturers in both cases.

IMO:2.1: My observation

• Code is fused in the premises of the chip manufacturers in both cases. Has ECI, per Article 8. UNCAC Codes of conduct for public officials “(5)establish measures and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials”, established polices and procedures of all personnel including the highest authority of the concerned reputed public sector undertakings on which ECI has full confidence as well as the chips manufacturer/distributor?

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

2. Are the CU & BU cards sealed and signed by the party representatives as suggested by the Prof. INDIRESAN committee report?

CU & BU cards are sealed by sealing the cover of the machine in the presence of representatives of political parties and candidates.

IMO:2.2: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.1

3. Is there a micro controller in the BU both in old and new machines? Is it the same OTP or mask as in CU or a different chip?

BEL – In old EVM only the CU has micro controller which is OTP. In the new EVM both BU and CU have micro controllers both BU and CU micro controllers are OTP.

ECIL – No micro controller in old BUs. Masked micro controller in old CU. Masked micro controller in the new EVM in both BU and CU.

IMO:2.3: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.1

4. How many Electronic Voting Machines used were upgraded in the election held recently?

No existing machines were upgraded. Hence the question does not arise.

IMO:2.4: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.1

5. Is there a self test signature for every Electronic Voting Machine including machines prior to 2006 and post 2006? If there is a signature available what is the process adopted and what are the records maintained for the same?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:2.5: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.1

• In addition, reply of the Commission fails to address the issues on, what are the records maintained for the same? Since the issues involved on account of EVM being misused for corrupt practices, the records maintenance is of paramount importance to prove the steps taken on Preventive Measures per Chapter II UNCAC, besides one or more of the four parties involved in the EVM operations is based outside India.

  • Investigation under UNCAC can emanate from either of the countries that need records maintenance at each stage of the EVM process chain. Therefore ECI per Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting shall disclose on information of records maintenance in order to satisfy enabling Article 55. UNCAC – which states – International cooperation for purposes of confiscation, clause 2. Following a request made by another State Party having jurisdiction over an offence established in accordance with this Convention, the requested State Party shall take measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 31, paragraph 1, of this Convention for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either by the requesting State Party or, pursuant to a request under paragraph 1 of this article, by the requested State Party.

  • Article 31 UNCAC: Freezing, seizure and confiscation states: 1. Each State Party shall take, to the greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system, such measures as may be necessary to enable confiscation of:

    • (a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences established in accordance with this Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds;

    • (b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in offences established in accordance with this Convention.

6 Is there any other form of encryption used to store the data in EEPORM apart from dynamic key coding?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:2.6: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.5

7. Is it a static allocation of memory in the EEPROM to store every vote like an incremental counter or whether it’s read back vote by vote while results

operation is being executed?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:2.7: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.5, in addition:

• The question raised by Shri V.V. Rao relates to post-poll controls of votes tally. Please refer IMO:1.10: 122 out of 12.99 lacs EVMs may sound miniscule in a statistical crowd of 120 crores citizens of India but throwing away a vote casted by an eligible voter violates – Article 13. UNCAC Participation of society (a) Enhancing the transparency of and promoting the contribution of the public to decision-making processes.

• The secrecy clause does not apply to the process flow of counting votes and ECI fails to satisfy the query that would bring about confidence to the voters who discharge their ethical responsibility by participating in the election process.

• ECI should have brought out the procedural aspect of counting votes assuring the voters how discrepancy may happen and what precaution is taken to check possible flaws during counting .

• At this juncture it is important to note polling day discrepancies that continue to haunt the voters’ minds on account of EVM. To quote from published report on discrepancy during the polling day of the General Election 2009^iv: Sun TV had been broadcasting election polling statistics continually. Announcing the statistics of votes polled, in front of media State Election Commissioner conveyed at 3.30 PM, for Central Chennai as 33%, North Chennai Constituency 31.5%, South Chennai 34.5%. At 4.30 PM it was announced ‘since the sun is less severe people have started voting with enthusiasm’. ..End of the day announcement of total votes polled stood at 74% for Chennai. That means within 1½ hours nearly 50% of voters had polled. (சன் டிவியில் தேர்தல் வாக்கு எண்ணிக்கையை பற்றி செய்தி வந்து கொண்டே இருந்தது. மாலை மூன்றரை மணி வரை வாக்குப் பதிவைப்  பற்றி வந்த செய்தி என்னவென்றால், மத்திய சென்னை தொகுதயில் 33 சதவீதமும், வடசென்னையில் 31 .5 % மும் தென் சென்னையில் 34 .5 % மும் வாக்குகள் பதிவாகியிருந்தன என்று அனைத்து செய்தியாளர்களுக்கும் முன்னிலையில் நேரடியாக பேட்டி  அளித்தார் மாநில தேர்தல் கமிசனர். ஆனால் மாலை 4 .30 மணிக்கு செய்தி ஒளிபரப்பில்  ‘ வெயில் தணிந்ததால் மக்கள் உற்ச்சாகமாக வாக்களித்ததாக‘ செய்தி காட்டப் பட்டது. அதிக வாக்கு எண்ணிக்கையை  நம்ப வைக்க ஒரு முன்னோட்டம் செய்து கொள்ளும் தந்திரம். இதைத் தொடர்ந்து மாலை வாக்குப் பதிவு முடிந்த நிலையில் 74 % மொத்த வாக்குப் பதிவு நடை பெற்றதாக அறிவிக்கப் பட்டது. அதாவது ஒன்றரை மணி நேரத்தில் கிட்டத்தட்ட சென்னையில் மட்டும் மனசு மாறிய சுமார் 50 % வாக்காளர்கள் வாக்களித்துவிட்டதாக அதிகாரப் பூர்வமாக அறிவிக்கப் பட்டது. அதுவும் வெயில் போய்  விட்டதால் நாட்டைப்பற்றிக் கவலைப் பட்ட சென்னை வாக்காளர்கள்!)

• In the city of Sparta of yore a murder to be proved had to have an eye witness. Today circumstantial evidence can confirm a wrong-doing. Reverse engineering need not be proved.

• A comparative assessment of EVM with paper ballot clearly indicates superiority of paper ballot over EVM by 1: ∞

• ECI is defending the rights of reputed public sector undertakings on which ECI has full confidence, while disregarding the fundamental rights of the people of India.

• ECI by Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting shall convey the information sought by Shri. V.V. Rao.

8. Did the Election Commission take the complete print out of every key pressed wherever there were incidents of malfunctioning of Electronic Voting Machines? As Expert Committee insisted on Data & Time Stamping every key pressed. Please provide details of such EVMs selected and the outcome after taking such printouts.

After the counting is over and results are declared, EVMs are sealed and kept in strong room. They cannot be opened without the order of competent court. Therefore, it is not permissible to take a printout as suggested in the question. (On the orders of the court such print outs have been taken). For declaration of results, in case there is a display malfunction, printouts of results only are taken. Printout of each key pressed as a rule is not taken because of secrecy of voting. In extreme contingency when the results are not possible any other way, with prior permission of Commission, key press prints have been taken out in rarest of the rare cases to ascertain the result.

IMO:2.8: My observation

• If pre-poll preparatory exercise of an EVM is capacitated for promoting corrupt practices in every binary bit, the post-poll exercise of secrecy is an incapacitated EVM preventing access to information of corrupt practices successfully executed.

• A simple paper ballot under lock and key would suffice to furnish the necessary information sought by the court, if there ever need be. A case pending in the courts on account of Sivaganga constituency of 2009 General Elections would never have happened in the first instance with a paper ballot and even if there is a dispute the courts would have arrived at a decision much before the term of 5 years expires.

• By Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting ECI should publish the advantage and disadvantage of EVMs – pre-poll and post-poll scenario with specific areas of corrupt practices.

• In extreme contingency when the results are not possible any other way – ECI should call for a re-poll – with the most reliable, time-tested and simple, paper ballot.

9. Why did Election Commission disregard certain suggestions made by the Expert Committee in regards with the modifications & upgrade of the Electronic Voting Machines used in the elections held recently?

All suggestions made by the Expert Committee have been implemented by the manufacturers. The suggestions of Expert Committee regarding post poll analysis has also been implemented in the machines, as it is possible to take a sequential print

out of every vote cast during the poll. After the counting is over and results are declared, EVMs are sealed and kept in strong room and under the law

they come under the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, they cannot be opened without the order of competent court. Therefore, it is permissible to do a post poll analysis as suggested by the Expert Committee only on the orders of the competent court.

IMO:2.9: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.8:

• Considering the delayed justice on account of EVM malpractices, has court ever been asked by ECI the advantage or disadvantage of EVM over paper ballot for disposal of cases brought to the courts?

• By Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting, ECI shall publish the findings of the courts of pending cases.

10. What are the total number of votes that can be polled in an EVM, as Expert Review Report “Draft 1989-90

EVM’s Replacement Additional features contemplated” mentions it to be 2000 maximum votes whereas FAQ’s on ECI website mentioned it to be 3840? Is there a difference in the maximum votes between old & new machines?

For BEL – Total no. of votes that can be polled in 2000-2004 model EVMs 3840 and 2006-2009 model EVMs is 2000.

For ECIL – In the new machines it is limited to 2000 votes and in the old machines (prior to 2006) it is 3902.

IMO:2.10: My observation

• In addition to the risks of EVMs criss-crossing, randomization, software, object code, encryption, blind outsourcing, limitations of an EVM of 2000 appear reasonable, on the face of it. However, the advantage of paper ballots outscores an EVM on this count as booth-capturing has to be physical with gun-toting masqueraders are identifiable whereas booth-capturing by an EVM can be done stealthily under the cloak of confidentiality clause gifted to the manufacturers.

• ECI in its letter to Shri V.V.Rao states: It is clear .. that in spite of many opportunities given to you by the Election Commission of India you have not been able to demonstrate and prove your allegation of tamperability in ECI-EVMs.

• booth-capturing by an EVM can be done stealthily – is a statement that does not warrant a proof. ECI has outsourced its responsibility, to third-parties on whom ECI has no administrative control, on a subject ECI depends on an expert committee, by not complying to Article 9. UNCAC Public procurement and management of public finances, 1…take the necessary steps to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption, thereby opening up risk factors for corrupt practices that ECI is unaware. The risks exist in every binary bit of the EVM and the proof of booth-capturing stealthily or asking Shri V.V. Rao to demonstrate and prove .. allegation of tamperability in ECI-EVMs, is furnished by a different source – CBI Director – It is estimated that around 500 billion dollars of illegal money belonging to Indians is deposited in tax havens abroad. Largest depositors in Swiss Banks are also reported to be Indians,” CBI Director A.P. Singh while speaking at the inauguration of first interpol global programme on anti-corruption and asset recovery^v.

• ECI must understand and learn the concept of study of cost consequence of their actions as well as inactions. Damage is already done. Shri V.V.Rao has done a yeoman service to the nation by bringing to the attention of ECI pertinent queries of significance.

11. What is the size of EEPROM used & what is the size of data used to store every vote?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:2.11: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.10:

12. What is the time diversity algorithm used for transmission of data? US Patent 4001692

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:2.12: My observation

• Same as IMO:2.10:

13. Did Prof Indiresan committee evaluate the EVMs with detachable memory module (DMM)? If not why EVMDMM models are not considered for evaluation? Are they used in any elections?

ECI-EVMs do not have DMM. Therefore, the question does not arise.

IMO:2.13: My observation

• If not why EVMDMM models are not considered for evaluation? ECI should have checked the advantage of DMM but failed to give an adequate reply.

• By Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting ECI shall publish the advantage and disadvantage of using DMM in EVM.

14. Had the technical committee led by Prof Indiresan considered the point on wilful Trojans inserted by the developers themselves?

The question has been considered by the Committee. The Committee did not find that it was possible to do so under conditions where administrative procedure prescribed by ECI is followed.

IMO:2:14: My observation

• where administrative procedure prescribed by ECI is followed – developers belong to a different organisation and administratively report to different entity that ECI has no administrative control whatsoever.

• If and when administrative procedures prescribed by ECI is flouted with the collusion of the highest authority of the concerned reputed public sector undertakings on which ECI has full confidence, how and what way the policies and procedures are set by ECI to identify the practices or malpractices of BEL and ECIL, as well as the chips manufacturer/distributor?

• Has ECI, per Article 8. UNCAC Codes of conduct for public officials “(5)establish measures and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials”, established polices and procedures of all personnel including the highest authority of the concerned reputed public sector undertakings on which ECI has full confidence as well as the chips manufacturer/distributor?

15. Can a simple functional test be able to identify a Trojan inserted?

The presence of Trojan in ECI-EVMs is hypothetical. Therefore, this question itself is hypothetical. So far nobody has been able to demonstrate the presence of a Trojan in ECI-EVMs. The method of detection of a Trojan has been given in the report of the Expert Committee. According to the report of the Expert Committee, a Trojan can be detected by looking at a pattern in the post poll printout. This printout can be taken only on the order of a competent court. Besides, complete functional tests are carried out by the manufacturers before sending the EVM machines out of the factory, at the time of first level checking, machine setting by RO and mock poll before the actual poll.

IMO:2:15: My observation

• So far nobody has been able to demonstrate the presence of a Trojan in ECI-EVMs. UnderQuestions – Security, replying to Qn (7), ..on EVMs lost – ECI states: Since April, 2009, Looted – 71, Destroyed – 225, No EVM recovered, ECI is aware of the floating population of EVMs in the country, but yet would presume such EVMs as stolen property should anyone take steps to demonstrate the presence of a Trojan in ECI-EVMs.

• How does ECI assume all EVMs that were handed over by the manufacturers remain genuine? If every component of the EVM and object codes and software are outsourced why ECI had not considered outsourcing Quality Control of the EVMs to another independent body corporate?

• Why ECI not considered Article 50 UNCAC Special investigative techniques,1. In order to combat corruption effectively, each State Party shall, to the extent permitted by the basic principles of its domestic legal system and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by its domestic law, take such measures as may be necessary, within its means, to allow for the appropriate use by its competent authorities of controlled delivery and, where it deems appropriate, other special investigative techniques, such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover operations, within its territory, and to allow for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom?

• Article 2. UNCAC Use of terms defines (i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence.

16. What kind of verification process was involved in the evaluation of EVM’s by Technical Committee i.e. UAT, Functional Test or a simple over all Process Check, further are there any reports of these tests available?

The Expert Committee has carried out complete verification of EVMs to its satisfaction. The details are available in the Expert Committee Report.

IMO:2:16: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

17. Post the changes made by the manufacturers of EVM according to the recommendations of Expert Committee review report were tests performed if so what are the test methods & test reports?

Manufacturers of EVMs have carried out tests and given a compliance report.

IMO:2:17: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

• Replies of the Commission for the 17 queries under ‘Questions – On Expert Committee Report’, reflect the limitations of ECI and dependency on outside sources for the success of EVMs.

• The major casualty of EVM is Accountability.

1. What is the hardware level security (Board level & component level) on both the Ballot Unit & Control Unit provided to avoid Non-Invasive, Invasive & Semi-Invasive attacks?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:3:1: My observation

• ECI must explain the preventive measure initiated and applied to avoid non-invasive, Invasive & Semi-invasive attacks.

• ECI must by Article 10 UNCAC Public Reporting publish a daily and cumulative update of such incidents.

2. Is there any security standard adopted in the EVM? If so please specify.

Security standards have been adopted. These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers for IP reasons, and also because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering.

IMO:3:2: My observation

• Same as IMO:3:1:

3. Are the EVMs covered or fall under E-Governance? Are e- governance standards applied to EVM?

Voting at elections is governed by the provisions of R.P. Act, 1951 and not by IT Act. ECI-EVMs are fully compliant with the provisions of R.P. Act, 1951.

IMO:3:3: My observation

• ECI-EVMs are fully compliant with the provisions of R.P. Act, 1951 – quote from GVLN Rao, Use of EVMs in 2004 & 2009 Lok Sabha polls was Illegal^vi, Quote:

  • The amendment to the RP Act did not empower the Election Commission to introduce electronic voting machines on a nationwide scale in 2004 and 2009.

  • The amendment made to the RP Act in the form of 61A in 1989 allowed use of EVMs selectively and did not envisage blanket use of EVMs on a universal basis. The amendment to the act states that voting machines “may be adopted in such constituency or constituencies as the Election Commission may, having regard to the circumstances of each case, specify.”

  • Further Explanation provided  under Section 61 A in the RP Act reads as follows: Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “voting machine” means any machine or apparatus whether operated electronically or otherwise used for giving or recording of votes and any reference to a ballot box or ballot paper in this Act or the rules made thereunder shall, save as otherwise provided, be construed as including a reference to such voting machine wherever such voting machine is used at any election. Unquote

• Voting at elections is governed by the provisions of R.P. Act, 1951 and not by IT Act – Ethical Responsibility is the exclusive domain of a voter, who votes for the best candidate to the legislature persons of honesty and integrity. The three wings of government has only Fiscal Responsibility that includes ECI too. Public officials have fiduciary duties and responsibilities towards the beneficiary – the people of India. ECI’s main and possibly the only duty is to enable a voter to discharge his/her ethical responsibility.

  • Relevance of applicability of IT Act is in assessing, by use of EVM, what is the extent of interference the voters come across while discharging their duties of ethical responsibility.

• Same logic applies to UNCAC. India being a signatory to the Convention, ECI ought to have applied the provisions of UNCAC effective October 2003 when UN General Assembly adopted the same.

  • EVM sans UNCAC, prevents the government of its fiduciary responsibility of reaching the beneficiary – people of India.

• By not incorporating IT Act and provisions of UNCAC, EVM stands to prove what GVLN Rao states: Use of EVMs in 2004 & 2009 Lok Sabha polls was Illegal

4. What is the prevention mechanism against Replication of EVMs? Can it be identified by a non technical person?

BEL and ECIL can identify fake EVMs. EVMs are kept in secure conditions. There are detailed instructions of the ECI on access control. Besides this there is electronic security in EVMs which is confidential and known only to BEL and ECIL.

IMO:3:4: My observation

• known only to BEL and ECIL – ECI has no administrative control over BEL and ECIL who report to a central government minister. Further to the statement of GVLN Rao, Use of EVMs in 2004 & 2009 Lok Sabha polls was Illegal it shall be added use of EVM continues to be illegal even today.

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

5. Is there any test to validate the ballot unit other than the Mock poll? (As the mock poll is not possible in case of BU change in the middle of the poll).

Yes. This validation is done at first level checking and at the time of setting the machine by the RO including that of the reserve EVMs which include both CU and BU.

IMO:3:5: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

6. How many EVM circuit cards are replaced on malfunction while maintenance? What is the status of

the OLD cards?

Less than 0.01%. Old cards are repaired and reused wherever possible. Wherever it is not possible to use them, they are destroyed under strict supervision.

IMO:3:6: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

• Having declared, see 1.6 above, ECI does not keep records of components, These records are maintained by the manufacturers, the reply by the Commission destroyed under strict supervision lacks credibility.

7. How many machines are abducted/destroyed in poll disturbances? How many are recovered?

Since April, 2009

Looted – 71

Destroyed – 225

No EVM recovered

IMO:3:7: My observation

• Destroyed – 225 is a misnomer. Does it mean – destroyed, physically verified, could not be repaired and hence not recovered, buried under strict supervision, no components could be extracted, duly recorded and records available for inspection? If it means lost but not recovered, then the total lost is 296 and not just 71.

• ECI asking Shri V.V. Rao to demonstrate and prove .. allegation of tamperability in ECI-EVMs, therefore is superfluous, as 296 stealth bombers have been created for a hacker that is made very easy and simple.

• Since the number of possibilities exist in the event of even for a single lost EVM unit, with 295 as bonus to master the art of tampering lacs of EVMs, is there a procedure an instructions set by ECI, i. to order re-poll or ii. change the software in every other EVM in control of ECI?

• ECI shall compare the above situation during a paper ballot election, even on account of booth-capturing vis-a-vis lost EVMs gifted to organisations working to destabilise democracy in India.

8. How many spare machines shall be kept ready per assembly constituency and parliament constituency? Are they part of First level and Second level

randomization?

ECI instructions are to keep approximately 10% reserve. They are also randomized. First level check is done on them as well.

IMO:3:8: My observation

• Compare the advantage and disadvantage of EVM over paper ballots in a constituency of several booths.

9. Who developed the Randomization software? Is there any kind of security validation done to the randomization software?

ECI gave detailed instructions for randomization of EVMs before use in the elections to enhance transparency and greater participation of the

stakeholders in the system. ECI has laid down parameters of randomization for which the CEOs and DEOs in their respective State/District develop randomization software. The details of the instructions are enclosed at Annexure-1.

IMO:3:9: My observation

• Compare the advantage and disadvantage of EVM over paper ballots in a constituency of several booths.

IMO:3:1- 3.9: Questions – Security: My observation

• From 1960s when card readers enabled data collection faster, process areas like inventory, wages, accounting, documentation came predominantly attractive for use of computer technology. However it took years of parallel run to switch over from manual to mechanised accounting, particularly wages calculation. Computation of average piece-rates, overtime, leave pay, paise rounding-off etc. needed months of convincing the union and labourers needed to be convinced before the wage packets were distributed and accepted willingly.

• GVLN Rao assertion in his blog, Use of EVMs in 2004 & 2009 Lok Sabha polls was Illegal^vii, that

  • The amendment to the RP Act did not empower the Election Commission to introduce electronic voting machines on a nationwide scale in 2004 and 2009.

  • The amendment made to the RP Act in the form of 61A in 1989 allowed use of EVMs selectively and did not envisage blanket use of EVMs on a universal basis. #The amendment to the act states that voting machines “may be adopted in such constituency or constituencies as the Election Commission may, having regard to the circumstances of each case, specify.”

  • is quite accurate as the parallel run of ensuring use of EVM in a few booths could have brought better results than plunging into areas unknown to ECI such as control of object code or encryption that ECI continues to be threatened by manufacturers of EVM in the name of secrecy and confidentiality. ECI has not acquired the process know-how of their own nor adopted a systematic approach to switch over from paper ballot to EVM.

• Secondly, the year 1995 saw a Dutch firm ING, buying up Baring plc for a nominal amount of $1.60, after one single individual Nick Leeson aged 28 brought down the bank with reckless gambling, speculating on the Tokyo Stock Exchange losing $1.3 billion, making the 220 year old bank insolvent.

  • At that time neither the top management of Baring plc nor the auditors had any clue about what derivatives were all about.

  • The scenario in 2011 is no different when Rogue UBS Trader Kweku Adoboli was charged With Fraud of $2 billion on 17th September 2011.

  • BEL, ECIL, chips manufacturers are comparable to Nick Leesons and ECI to top management of Baring plc. and India to Baring plc.

• What Shri V.V.Rao painstakingly brought to the notice of ECI was indeed a good yell in high decibels to CEC of ECI, “King has no clothes”. ECI is not noticing.

1. What are the specifications of Hardware, Firmware & Interfacing?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:1: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

2. What are Standards & Guidelines followed while coding?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:2: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

3. What are Standards followed for designing the Hardware?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:3: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

4. What are the standards followed in designing the Encasings?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:4: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

5. What are the Certifications available for Hardware?

Internal process and Quality audits during design and manufacturing phases to ensure quality product as per ISO 9001:2000.

IMO:4:5: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

• In addition: emergence and purpose of ISO 9000

  • It is worth recalling the system prevailing during the days earlier to the introduction of ISO 9000 in EU.

    • By the old system of national product testing and certification procedures the practice was, for example, that before a British-made vehicle could be sold on the Italian market its brakes would have to be sent to Italian inspectors for testing before going back to Britain for installation and eventual shipment back to Italy.

    • ISO 9000 set to resolve such waste of time and resources with a view to harmonize standards among nations. To quote Times Guide 1992 [report on ISO 9000-1992: Cecchini committee]: “The traditional approach, which required years of fortuitous negotiations to arrive at a common position for a single product standard, was internally bureaucratic, extremely unpopular and very time consuming. By the time the new product standard had emerged from the bureaucratic briefcase and onto the shop floor it had been made redundant by the pace of technological development. Lord Cockfield in the Internal Market White Paper called for the distinction in all internal market legislation to be made between ‘what is essential to harmonize and what may be left to mutual recognition of national standards. The general principle should be approved that, if a product is lawfully manufactured and marketed in one member State, there is no reason why it should not move freely throughout the community.”

• ECI has to acquire in-house expertise on matters relating to quality standards of EVM as Cechhini report says: By the time the new product standard had emerged from the bureaucratic briefcase and onto the shop floor it had been made redundant by the pace of technological development.

• Holding on to a third-party ISO 9000 certificate for EVM product that ECI does not manufacture is like missing the forest for the trees.

6. What are the test cases & reports of the entire project?

Equipment is tested as per QA manual.

IMO:4:6: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

7. Was any Risk Analysis performed?

Yes.

IMO:4:7: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

• In addition:

• Was any Risk Analysis performed? Yes?

• Please publish per Article 10 UNCAC Public reporting the risks analysis undertaken by ECI –

  • i. corrupt practices,

  • ii. denial of fundamental rights to a voter,

  • iii. rigged results enabling formation of corrupt government,

  • iv. outside activities of public officials, their employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as part of –

  • EVM team Vs. paper balloting system of ECI electoral team.

8. What is methodology of Full Load test?

Full performance functional checks simulating all the test conditions.

IMO:4:8: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

• paper balloting – In the event of number of candidates are many, add 5 gsm for every 20 candidates.

9. What are the fail-safe parameters for Firmware, Hardware as well as Interfaces?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:9: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

10. Was any Disaster recovery mechanism adopted?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:10: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

11. Is the Hardware unit capable of interoperability, to avoid monopoly & vendor Lock-In?

CUs and BUs of the same manufacturers & same model are interoperable.

IMO:4:11: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

12. What are the MTBF (Mean Time between Failures) of various components used?

ECIL – Approx. 10000 hours

BEL – Approx. 7800 hours

IMO:4:12: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

13. Does the Program memory in the EVM chip is fully utilized by program? In case not is the space left out in the program memory is filled safe in the controller without Trojans?

These details are kept confidential by the manufacturers because secrecy of these details is necessary for security of EVM and prevention of reverse engineering and also for IP reasons.

IMO:4:13: My observation

• EVM – from chips manufacturing to finished product with in-house software development directly under the supervision and control of ECI is a plausible alternative to paper ballots. Not till then.

• In addition:

  • In case not is the space left out in the program memory is filled safe in the controller without Trojans? – It is a safe question and a good opportunity for ECI to have taken note of it, i. in giving the requisite order to the manufacturer that to comply with the question raised by Shri V. V. Rao, ii. in replying to Shri V. V. Rao appreciating his concern and good suggestion to correct the rigging problem of the EVM units, iii. in assuring the public of the confidence they could repose on the machine.

  • Instead ECI has provided a safe haven for Trojans.

Summary: 4 Questions – Technical

IMO:4:1 – 4.13: My observation

• The technical direction through an outsourced manufacture and use of EVM is not only deprived the voter of his/her fundamental rights but if one carefully notes the outsourced manufacture of EVM has deprived ECI repeat ECI of its powers. ECI is left defending the technical capability or incapability of reputed public sector companies on whom ECI has no control whatsoever.

• ECI by outsourcing the entire process of coding, encryption, memory controller, object code etc. through EVM, has surrendered the entire process of election machinery to third-parties.

• Technology roadmap and migration strategies need to be revised by ECI. 700 million voters offer a huge data. Retention and accuracy of the database is where the technological direction and roadmap need to be led – revolving around a ballot paper.

• Scrap EVM, use only a ballot paper, standardise the size A5, A4, A3.., quicken the process of voter ID, smart-card, eye/thumb verification.. unbreakable transparent glass drop box, facility to suck in the ballot paper, connect (electrical without chips) to a counter display, connect display counter to the server, connect server to the internet enabling votes polled information constantly displayed like cricket score, avoid 32% at 3.30 PM, excuse talk at 4.30 PM and then declaring 74% at 5 pm.

  • Tally the votes, remove the electrical chord, write with an indelible ink (not the disappearing ink), seal, enclose the glass box in another non-penetrative of signals box, seal, get party agents signatures, store in ECI owned safe-deposit vault, guarded by ECI special force,

  • open the seal on counting day, connect the chord to display unit, press the dispenser button from each box to spew out the polled votes, pick a bundle of votes, like currency notes counting machine create votes counting machine with facility of image readers, count the votes for packet 1 by each party, pass packet 1 to the manual counting, start 100% manual counting for a few elections as parallel run slowly reducing to a lower %, then introduce later random check, confirm the efficacy of the counting machines 100%,

  • then pass on to the next electronic votes reader, re-count votes by party electronic reading, tally the votes by party, connect the display unit to the server, connect to the internet, let the 700 million votes count party by party be made available online to 7 billion people.

  • All with a ballot paper within the control of ECI and all electronic purchases bought out by Article 9. UNCAC Public procurement and management of public finances, 1…take the necessary steps to establish appropriate systems of procurement, based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making, that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption.

• Knowledge is the goal of ethics. The database ECI creates shall lead the nation with data that an EVM now prevents which a stumbling block of knowledge creation.

• Scrap EVM immediately.